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health, Erasmus sees war and violence as aberrant pathology-in nature, in society, and in the individual. 7 Rather than identical with force, Erasmus sees power or authority as distinct from it.I8 The duty of Erasmus' prince consists not of making or preparing for war but rather of avoiding it and serving his people, on whose satisfaction he depends for legitimacy. Real power and true heroism lie not in physical dominance over others but in self-mastery. I9 To establish and maintain peace should be the goal of all princes, a goal achieved by the greatest spiritual and temporal leaders in history, Jesus and Augustus.20
In 1517 Erasmus published another of his numerous anti-war works, The Complaint of Peace (Querela Pacis), headed with the epigraph, "The Sum of All Religion is Peace and Unanimity." 21 In it he adds a series of pragmatic objections against militarism to the spiritual ones in the Institutio. War is conducted not for the benefit of the people but for the aggrandizement of princes; the hoped for benefits of battle-righting wrongs, gaining territory, resolving disputes, revenging hurts-never approximate the actual costs in lives, property, and social disruption: "There is scarcely any peace so unjust, but it is preferable, on the whole, to thejustest war. Sit down before you draw the sword, weigh every article, omit none, and compute the expence of blood as well as treasure which war requires, and the evils which it of necessity brings with it; and then see at the bottom of the account whether after the greatest success, there is likely to be a balance in your favor."22 And while Machiavelli praises religion for providing an invaluable ideological support for political strategists, Erasmus directs his strongest invective against those who attempt to use religion to aid in making war:
Let us now imagine we hear a soldier, among these fighting Christians, saying the Lord's prayer. "Our Father" says he; O hardened wretch! can you call him father when you arejust going to cut your brother's throat? "Hallowed be thy name" how can the name of God be more impiously unhallowed, than by mutual bloody murder among you, his sons? "Thy kingdom come" do you pray for the coming of his kingdom, while you are endeavoring to establish an '7Ibid., 249.
I8Ibid., 163. earthly despotism, by spilling the blood of God's sons and subjects? Dare you to say to your Father in heaven "Give us this day our daily bread;" when you are going, the next minute perhaps, to burn up your brother's corn fields; and had rather lose the benefit of them yourself, than suffer him to enjoy them unmolested? With what face can you say, "Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us," when, so far from forgiving your own brother, you are going, with all the haste you can, to murder him in cold blood, for an alleged trespass that, after all is but imaginary. Do you presume to deprecate the danger of temptation who, not without great danger to yourself, are doing all you can to force your brother into danger? Do you deserve to be delivered from evil, that is, from the evil being, to whose impulse you submit yourself, and by whose spirit you are now guided, in contriving the greatest possible evil to your brother. 23 This outpouring of pacifist sentiment was at first welcomed by the monarchs to whom it was directed. Under the influence of Cardinal Wolsey, who seemed to share Erasmus' and More's views that religion should condemn rather than encourage war, Henry VIII agreed to make a treaty of"Universal Peace" with his rival, Francis I: "This peace treaty with France was an element in a much wider scheme which Wolsey was promoting on behalf of the whole of Eu- The status of pacifist ideas oscillated between subversive and orthodox throughout the Renaissance, depending upon the shifting alliances and moods of rulers. After being lionized by both Charles and Henry, Erasmus became persona non grata at the courts of the great and retired to his study in Basel in 1521. The Complaint became a dangerous text, anonymously translated into English, and condemned and burned both by the French and the Spanish authorities.33 The "Spanish Erasmians" were forbidden to publish additions to "Charon" by the censors of Charles, as Erasmus himself had predicted: "matters are come to such a pass, that it is deemed foolish and wicked to open one's mouth against war, or to venture a syllable in praise of peace; the constant theme of Christ's eulogy. He is thought to be ill affected to the king, and even to pay but little regard to the people's interests, who recommends what is of all things in the world the most salutary, to both king and people, or dissuades from that which without any exception is the most destructive. "34 One can surmise that during the period of dynastic and growing religious warfare in the later sixteenth century, pacifist ideas were suppressed rather than "dying away," as claimed by Hale. Indeed, they make their persistence known by the vituperation of attacks upon them in militaristic literature and religious propaganda. In Marlowe's Tamburlaine, for example, Calyphas is stabbed to death by his heroic father for refusing to join battle after his scruples against killing are ascribed to a voluptuous laziness. "thou saist thou art going to thy Patron Mars with a supplication for bettering thy estate, and how, by war: wher how many rapes wrongs and murders are committed, thy selfe be judge, all which thou esteemest not of, so thy own want be supplied"36-he is punished by Mars with the ruin of his city. And the many sermons by Protestant divines cited by Lily Campbell to show ecclesiastical support for a war policy are designed to neutralize the pacifism of the early church advocated by Anabaptists throughout sixteenthcentury Europe.37
The claims of war and of peace also remained in tension during royal spectacles. At a "grand triumph in honor of peace" in Lyon celebrating the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis that brought a temporary close to the hostilities among Spain, France, and England in 1559, "journeymen printers erected a colossal god Mars thirty feet high and bristling with arms. As Mars burned, there gradually emerged from within him, safe and sound, the white figure of Minerva reclining with the nine Muses on the rock Parnassus, beneath which spouted a Castalian spring of wine and water, with Pegasus just leaving it: 'demonstrating that the death of Mars is the resurrection and the life of Minerva, goddess of wisdom and the liberal arts.' "38 And similar pageantry graced the triumphal entry of James I through London on his coronation in 1603: "at Temple Bar, James saw Peace at the gates of the Temple ofJanus, 'signifying . . . that Peace alone was better, and more to be coveted then innumer- The poles of this dispute generate a grid upon which Shakespeare's plots, characters, and themes can be charted-both in individual plays and over the course of his career. That career begins with the Marlovian militarism of the first history tetralogy and the glorification of violence in Titus Andronicus and The Taming of the Shrew, all written during the early I590S. In the mid-nineties, with KingJohn and the four plays of the second history tetralogy, the battlefield remains the arena for the exercise of both individual and collective virtue. But while the articulation of the militarist viewpoint becomes increasingly emphatic and sophisticated by the time of Henry Vin 1599, its margin of victory over pacifist critiques narrows almost to a standoff.
Troilus and Cressida, written in I602 or I603, marks a turning point. In it Shakespeare mounts an attack on classical war heros and on the very arguments for going to war he had supported earlier, and he undermines the whole set of values and symbols that constitute Renaissance military culture. The plays of Shakespeare's "tragic period" that follows Troilus and Cressida continue to focus on the problem of war but with a deepening psychological penetration. Othello, Macbeth, Anthony, Timon, and Coriolanus all are great generals whose martial virtues are shown to be tragically flawed. The plays in which they are protagonists reveal that military power, the highest value of both the hero and his society, is a, concomitant of deficiency in power over oneself and finally the loser in a battle with the greater power of love. In the late romances, Shakespeare continues to portray the psychological and ethical deficiencies of military men, but in the final acts of these tragicomedies, he moves from anti-militarist critiques to affirmations of the state of Peace. Whether it is the pastoral landscapes of Pericles and the Winter's Tale, the plenty and fertility associated with the Goddess Eirene in the pageants of the Tempest, the evocation of the Augustan and Christian pax universalis in Cymbeline, or the reconciliation of rivals in all of them, Shakespeare at the end of his career repeatedly evokes the positive symbolism of the pacifist tradition. In his very last play, armed with powers of wish fulfillment strengthened by his experience writing romance, Shakespeare takes on the more resistant material of history as a vehicle for expressing a pacifist outlook. In an ironic and poignant conclusion to the saga of Erasmian influence on Renaissance culture, the poet recreates Henry VIII, the king who betrayed the hopes of the London S4The larger question of the validity of pacifism in general cannot be adequately considered here. Three parallel studies of its evolution and role in European history-the first two sympathetic, the third hostile-are Johnson's and Brock's and Howard's (I978). It may be appropriate to briefly consider some of Howard's more telling critiques insofar as they are relevant to the present discussion. He identifies pacifism with "Liberalism" and claims that modern European history is dominated by the struggle between liberal and "traditional" approaches to war and peace. Rejecting the existing war system, the liberal searches for higher standards of international conduct and an alternative system of collective security. The "traditional" approach, affiliated with Clausewitz, Metternich, and Machiavelli, accepts international hostility as a norm, war as the inevitable extension of politics, and a balance of power as the closest possible facsimile to peace. Howard calls the history of pacifism "The melancholy story of the efforts of good men to abolish war but only succeeding thereby in making it more terrible" (I30). Its essential fallacy, he says, is "the habit, far older even than Erasmus, of seeing war as a distinct and abstract entity about which one can generalise at large." Instead, he claims, "war is simply a generic term for the use of armed force by states or aspirants to statehood for the attainment of their political objectives" (I33). Howard's definitions and first principles are vulnerable to several critiques. He explodes the concept of"war," which to many is a clear, distinct, and morally charged idea, into a mere generic term, and elevates "States or aspirants to statehood," a more slippery, context-bound, and morally questionable notion, into an absolute. He offers no justification for believing that raisons d'etat-the claims of any given state perceived by its ruler at any given time-necessarily outweigh universal humanitarian claims. He also fails to acknowledge that many pacifists or "liberals," including Erasmus and More, accept the use of military force in some circumstances while at the same time opposing war in general rather than perceiving it as a morally neutral and indistinguishable extension of other means to achieve political ends. War vs. Peace was a central concern of Elizabeth's foreign and domestic policies. Having been educated by a group of Humanist scholars who themselves were students of the London Reformers, the queen was inclined to avoid war for humanitarian as well as economic reasons.55 But she didn't hesitate to take a militarist posture to confront the aggressive conduct of foreign rivals or to strengthen her standing with her subjects. Elizabeth adopted a "middle way" in questions of war and peace as well as in religious disputes by containing conflicting forces in dynamic tension and by playing extreme factions against one another to strengthen her own royal authority. In chivalric celebration of war, Shakespeare aims the full blast of his rhetorical power at the audience of Henry V. The choruses inflame us to collaborate with the author in producing a spectacle to sweep away thought in a flood of patriotic passion. Along with the thrills of rockets red glare and bombs bursting in air, he invokes the romantic appeal of battle as an occasion for displaying mettle under fire in the face of bad odds. In addition to its emotional appeal, chivalry also provided ethical rationales for war which this play repeatedly invokes. Since Augustine, the church had evolved a doctrine of"just war" to regulate the military aristocracy and to exempt it from Biblical taboos against killing. Justification resided both in legitimate war aims -jus ad bellum -and in legitimate conduct of fighting, jus in bello.67 Shakespeare's Henry is extremely fastidious about securing thesejustifications, without which, he avers, his course is one of butchery. Both clergy and council assure him that his territorial claims on France are supported by the ancient Salique Law as well by the book of Numbers. The campaign is presented as an extension of the legal trial by combat whereby God himself adjudicates a dispute. And both sides from the start agree to adhere to its outcome, making war a means to establishing a lasting peace.
In his conduct of fighting, Henry again takes pains to act only, in his own words, according to "right and conscience." Before Harfleur he plays exactly by the rules, expressing his concern for the welfare of non-combatants by offering surrender with no peril to its citizens. He demonstrates pious respect for Church property in the war zone by executing his former crony Bardolph for stealing a pax, asserting the chivalric maxim "When lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is soonest winner" (3.6. I I ). The impression given by this account, however, is remote from the experience of many readers of the play. It ignores the sharply contrasting tonality of passages in which Shakespeare seems to repudiate or undermine the chivalric justifications of war. The choruses and speeches are followed not by the noble deeds they are designed to inspire, but rather by the cynical, self-serving plotting of the Archbishops in act one, the profiteering plans of the Eastcheap rascals in act two, the beating of the footsoldiers into the breach in act three, the questioning of the king's patriotism by Bates and Williams in act four, and the demobilization of Pistol into pickpocket and beggar in act five.69 The legal justifications of war are produced as a quid pro quo for the King's opposition to a bill in Commons that would expropriate church revenues and devote them to "relief of lazars and weak age/Of indigent faint souls past toil/ A hundred almshouses right well supplied" (1.1.15-17). Soon after parading his lenity, the "gentler gamester" has the English cut the throats of their prisoners on stage, and then cries foul when the French murder his own luggage carriers in reprisal. And Henry's courtship verges at times on rape. To Katharine's reluctance to love "the ennemie of France," he responds, "I love France so well I will not part with a village of it" (5.2. 70), and he kisses her on the mouth before marriage against her protests and in deliberate violation of the customs of her house. Such contradictions of the chivalric vision of war force some to read Henry V as anamorphic--having two distinct and contradictory meanings depending on one's vantage7o-and others to conclude that in it Shakespeare means to criticize militarism with pacifist irony. My own reading, suggested by that of Stephen Greenblatt, is that the play undermines chivalric rationales for war, not to attack militarism itself, but to support it with pragmatic rationales for war that recognize, answer, and contain the pacifist objections that keep cropping up.7I
Thus the discrepancy between the high flights of the chorus and the conniving of the bishops is deliberate; in the words of Gunter Walch, it "shows the official ideology up for what it has become: an illusion effectively used as an instrument of power."72 Rather than showing it up, however, I think this play asks us to admire Henry's effectiveness. It depicts him mobilizing both the chivalric illusions of official ideology and the cynical self-interestedness of all of his subjects, and it shows his success at melding those conflicting interests into the common purpose of making war on France. Most of his subjects believe in chivalric justifications no more and no less than he does, and like his, their resolve is threatened by the anti-war arguments they don't dare to articulate. In act one's recurring debates about whether or not to proceed, only the king can take anti-war positions, in order to generate more pro-war arguments and to tease support from his allies.
Constructed as it is, that support is one Henry can never trust. Act two's chorus trumpets that "honor's thought/reigns solely in the breast of every man" (2.0. 3-4). This idea is repeated by Cambridge, Scrope, and Grey immediately before Henry exposes them as traitors. He does so by betraying them more craftily than they betrayed him, declaring before a multitude that their revolt "is like/ another fall of man" (2.2. 38-39). A politic piety, but also a recognition of the non-chivalric nature of his world, a world in which 70See Rabkin, 33-62. Dollimore and Sinfield (1985) also hold that the position of the play is indeterminate, reflecting the difficulties of maintaining ideological consistency: "There may be no way of resolving whether one, or which one of these tendencies (unity versus divergences) overrides the other in a particular play, but in a sense it does not matter: there is here an indeterminacy which alerts us to the complex but always significant process of theatrical representation and, through that, of political and social process" (215 Like trust, the chivalric quality of mercy has only relative value in this context. Henry teaches us this when the traitors deny mercy to a prisoner accused of railing on the king, then beg mercy for their attempt on his life. Mercy so granted would be cruel. And cruelty, we see in act three, the quality explicitly forbidden the chivalric warrior, can be merciful. The bloodcurdling speech at Harfleur, in which Henry hypocritically absolves himself of responsibility for the sadistic mayhem of his soldiers--"your naked infants spitted upon pikes," etc. As he kisses Katharine against her will, against custom, Henry asserts, "nice customs curtsy to great kings .... We are the makers of manners Kate, and the liberty that follows our places stops the mouth of all find-faults" (5.2.263). Henry makes his own rules in love as well as in war, like the hero of The Prince: "I am certainly convinced of this: that it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because Fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, in order to deep her down, to beat her and to struggle with her. And it is seen that she more often allows herself to be taken over by men who are impetuous than by those who make cold advances; and then, being a woman, she is always the friend of young men, for they are less cautious, more aggressive, and they command her with more audacity."73 And like Machiavelli's Fortuna, to this impetuousness and brutality the future queen willingly yields. 
Io8-IO). It is this vile behavior of hers that makes Troilus a great warrior-out of despair, not out of love, which at the opening of the play had kept him home at peace.74
The justice of the Greeks' war aims in reclaiming Helen is never mentioned; their militaristic rationales are not chivalric. But their two Machiavellian mechanisms of policy, force and fraud, are set at odds in the struggle between Achilles and Ulysses, the lion and the fox. Thus split, the Greeks are as incapable of achieving their own purely pragmatic purposes for war-morale, prestige, and conquest-as the Trojans are incapable of achieving honor and love. Achilles refuses to exert his strength, not so much because his pride is injured as because no personal wound has yet mobilized his fury. Ulysses' grand speech against faction slyly promotes faction as the antidote to faction, but unlike the choruses and speeches of Henry V, it fails as an ideological strategem. The tactics of robbing robbers or betraying betrayers that Henry used to such advantage backfire in this war, because here human motivations are too irrational and actual situations are too indeterminate to be controlled by such deliberate manipulation. As Thersites again observes: "the policy of these crafty swearing rascals ... is proved not worth a These abstract depictions of chaos are reflected in the psychological disintegration of all the major characters. In the minds of Troilus, Cressida, Hector, Ulysses, and Achilles, the powers of reason, will, appetite, and action are themselves warring factions that result in inconsistent, driven, self-destructive behavior. "Why should I war without the walls of Troy/That find such cruel battle here within?" are Troilus' first words. Some critics have seen a positive progression in his development toward a committed fighter at the end of the play, but his last words -"Hope of revenge shall 75Aho, 9-II. This idea is provocatively elaborated by Scarry: "The dispute that leads to the war involves a process by which each side calls into question the legitimacy and thereby erodes the reality of the other country's issues, beliefs, ideas, selfconception. Dispute leads relentlessly to war not only because war is an extension and intensification of dispute but because it is a correction and reversal of it. That is the injuring not only provides a means of choosing between disputants but also provides, by its massive opening of human bodies, a way of reconnecting the derealized and disembodied beliefs with the force and power of the material world .... It is when a country has become to its population a fiction that wars begin" (128-31). But while the audience of Troilus and Cressida regarded Hector's fallacious "honor" as mere self-deception and Troilus' valor as nihilistic rage, our response to Othello's defects is more complex. Even at his blindest and cruelest moments, we, like Desdemona, tend to commiserate with rather than condemn the Moor. And our strongest emotional response, created by the play's rhetoric of suspense, is to call out repeatedly to the character, "Don't do it, don't let yourself be trapped into a stupid game of violence." Just as we warn, so to some degree are we being warned by a monitory and didactic intent that moves us toward a rejection of martial heroism, yet which still acknowledges some of its values. The cost of this shift in values was great for a culture as heavily invested in militarism as seventeenth-century Christendom. Insofar as their "occupation's gone," Shakespeare's Jacobean heroes-Othello, Timon, Macbeth, Anthony, Lear, and Coriolanus -sustain a tragic loss; but insofar as those heros are shown to be brutal, driven, and anachronistic, Shakespeare displays that loss as an inevitable and ire."90 The thrust of the satire has been interpreted variously: by right-leaning critics as an attack on the plebeian mob whose selfseeking opportunism brings a principled and noble patrician to destruction, and by left-leaning critics as an attack on the aristocracy for their uncontrollable hatred of the proletariat they exploit. Campbell sees the commons and the patrician hero equally at fault and regards the play as an attack on class conflict itself, a conflict that violates the Tudor myth of degree and hierarchy articulated in Menenius' extended metaphor of the state as organic body.91 I believe, however, that as political satire, the play makes most sense when it is regarded, like Troilus and Cressida, as an attack on the bellicose policies and attitudes that create the war that provides the framework of the play's action.
That war is portrayed not in terms of glamor, glory, or heroism but rather as cruel butchery. In the words of G. Wilson This transformation is emphasized by the agonizingly prolonged moment of suspense indicated in the stage direction, a moment which also moves the audience from rejection to affirmation of peace. The same theatrical tactic of suspense is reinforced in the next scene, set back in Rome. Here patricians and plebs reproach one another while awaiting a common death at the hands of the Volsicians, having abandoned hope that Coriolanus will ever relent: "there is no more mercy in him than there is milk in a male tiger; that shall our poor city find." One messenger brings further bad news that the plebs are turning on their own tribunes. But then comes the word that "the ladies have We must not rend our subjects from our laws, And stick them in our will. Sixth part of each? A trembling contribution! Why, we take From every tree lop, bark and part of th'timber, And though we leave it with a root, thus hacked, The air will drink the sap. To every county Where this is question send our letters with Free pardon to each man that has denied The force of this commission. (93-IOI)"I The method of peacemaking rather than warmaking also guides Henry's palace politics. Instead of being decided by bloodshed, conflicts are resolved without violence. The king's antagonists will-""As mentioned earlier, most modern historians believe that it was Wolsey who was the pacifist, who tried to make peace both with France and Spain, and who was betrayed by the militaristic machinations of the real Henry VIII. Shakespeare's imaginary Henry here acts precisely in the manner that Thomas More's imaginary Hythloday had recommended to the real Henry VIII, disguised in More's text as the French king: "Hythloday: Now in a meeting like this one, where so much is at stake, where so many brilliant men are competing to think up intricate strategies of war, what if an insignificant fellow like myself were to get up and advise going on another tack entirely? Suppose I said the king should leave Italy alone and stay home ... suppose I told the French king's council that all this war-mongering, by which so many different nations were kept in social turmoil as a result of royal connivings and schemings, would certainly exhaust his treasury and demoralize his people, and yet very probably in the end come to nothing .... And therefore I would advise the French king to look after his ancestral kingdom, improve it as much as he could, cultivate it every conceivable way. He should love his people and be loved by them; he should live among them, and govern them kindly, and let other kingdoms alone, since his own is big enough, if not too big for him" (24-28). ingly yield to his authority and he forgives them--as in the cases of Buckingham, Katharine, and Wolsey-and the king produces compromise between competing factions of his supporters-as in the rivalry between them and Archbishop Cranmer.
Such hagiographic tribute to the king has seemed to some modern commentators like a form of kowtowing unworthy of Shakespeare's stature. Others have cited it to proclaim that Shakespeare's lifelong political agenda was to apologize for royal authority and beat the drum for British nationalism.' I But on the basis of the evidence presented here, one could also argue that after 1599 Shakespeare's own abhorrence of war became steadily more emphatic and that his enthusiastic support for James stemmed at least partially from his own desire to further the king's peacemaking mission. It is true that after Shakespeare's death, James's con- "England has for centuries been at work, consciously and unconsciously, to establish more than a national order. Her empire has already spread beyond the seas, this little island expanding and sending out her sons to make those 'new nations' of which Shakespeare's Cranmer so prophetically speaks . . . one feels a shadowing, a rough forecast, of the sovereign part to be played by the English-speaking nations in establishment of world-justice, world-order, and world-peace" (34-35). And in 1982, in a collection of essays entitled Authors Take Sides on the Falklands, Knight still further modified and yet reaffirmed this reading: "Our key throughout is Cranmer's royal prophecy at the conclusion of Shakespeare's last play Henry VIII, Shakespeare's final words to his countrymen. This I still hold to be our one authoritative statement, every word deeply significant, as forecast of the world-order at which we should aim" (cited by Hawkes, 68). Knight's superimposition of pacifism with royalism, imperialism, and cultural chauvinism amplifies the ironies in Shakespeare's depiction of Henry VIII as a Jacobean prince of peace.
